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Warner-Kramer: Control Begins at Home

ARTICLE
CONTROL BEGINS AT HOME:
TACKLING FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE
AND IUU FISHING
DEIRDRE WARNER-KRAMER'

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, French authorities arrested a vessel named the
Camouco, flagged to Panama, for illegally fishing Patagonian
toothfish near the Crozet Islands. Mter Panama successfully
petitioned the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for
its release,l the vessel was renamed the Arvisa 1 and flagged to
Uruguay. In January 2002, an Australian research vessel
spotted the Arvisa 1 fishing near Prydz Bay in eastern Antarctica; at the time the vessel claimed to be the Mauritanianflagged Kambott. By July 2002, now named the Eternal and
flagged to the Netherlands Antilles, she was again arrested for
Deirdre Warner-Kramer is Senior Atlantic Fisheries Officer in the Office of
Marine Conservation, U.S. Department of State. She is the lead State Department
representative on U.S. delegations to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO) and the International Commission for Atlantic Tunas (lCCAT), where she
negotiated both 2002's positive and negative vessel listing measures and 2003's comprehensive trade measure scheme. Ms. Warner-Kramer has a Bachelor of Arts from
Bryn Mawr College and has previously written on stateless fishing vessels. The views
expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of
the Department of State or the U.S. Government.
1 See Press Release, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Panama v. France) 35,
(February 7, 2000) for a summary of the judgment awarding prompt release in the
Camouco Case, available at http://www.itlos.org/newsipressJeleasel2000/press_
release_35_en.pdfOast visited March 17, 2004).
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illegally harvesting Patagonian toothfish in the French Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter "EEZ") off Kerguelen Island. 2
While the case of the vessel above is an extreme, it clearly
illustrates the problems that vessels flying flags of convenience3
pose to international fisheries management. Vessels like the
Camouco exploit the ease of changing names and registries to
avoid both effective control by their flag states and compliance
with regional fisheries management rules. And even when,
like the Camouco, they are caught engaging in illegal fishing,
the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction severely limits
the international community's ability to prosecute these vessels.
The sorts of fishing activities commonly labeled illegal, unreported, and unregulated (hereinafter "IUD") are broad in
scope and universal in occurrence;' fishing conducted by vessels
flying flags of convenience is only one small part of the global
IUD fishing phenomenon. Nonetheless, these vessels tend to
have high catch rates and are subject to little if any flag state
control or oversight. As such, they represent a threat to sustainable fisheries management disproportionate to their overall
number: and they have been the focus of much of the last decade's international efforts to impose order on high seas fisherIes.
States and international organizations may disagree on
the most effective approach to controlling or eliminating this
type of fishing, but most agree on the urgency of the situation.
Fully seventy-five percent of the world's fisheries resources are
being harvested at or beyond sustainable levels," and those
2 See Australia's 2001-2002 Rep. of Member's Activities to the Commission for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), available at
http://www.ccamlr.org/puJE/pubslmal01-02lAustralia-02.pdf, 4 (last visited March 17,
2004).
3 There is no agreed legal definition for "flag of convenience" or "open registry."
Although some States and international organizations make distinctions between the
two terms, in this paper they are treated as synonyms. See Section II, infra.
, See the definitions of IUU fishing in Section II of the International Plan of
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
Food and Agriculture Organization, 2001 [hereinafter IPOA-IUU].
5 The average length of fishing vessels flying flags of convenience in 1999 was
almost fifty meters; vessels this size represent a formidable catching power. See
Greenpeace International, 2001, Pirate Fishing: Plundering the Oceans, 8, (2001).
6 Food and Agriculture Organization, Fisheries Department, The State of World
Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002, 23 [hereinafter SOFIA).
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primarily fished on the high seas are among the hardest hit.
At the same time, the value of fish has increased tremendously
in the last decade - international trade in fish products hit a
record high of over $55 billion in 2000 following four percent
annual growth since 1990. The incentive to circumvent increasingly strict conservation and management regimes and
capitalize on ever-increasing market demand is powerful, and
some flag states either are not able or are not willing to ensure
compliance by their vessels.
This article looks at the efforts to control fishing by vessels
flying flags of convenience from a global, regional, and national
perspective. The international community has struggled for
decades with notions of flag State control over fishing vessels
and what kind of "genuine link" ought to exist between a vessel
and its State of registry. Global instruments negotiated in the
1990's looked for ways to elaborate the broad principles laid out
in international law up until that time. Regional fisheries
management organizations stepped in and developed a broad
suite of tools for combating IUU fishing in the fisheries under
their purview. And individual nations have taken up efforts to
exert control over vessels flying their flag and, in some cases, to
assist others to do the same.
7

I.

THE PROBLEM

Sources vary on exactly which states maintain open registries. One author has determined three categories of States in
regard to registration of ships: 1) those who maintain open registries, i.e. offer flags of convenience; 2) those who maintain
closed registries and set clear requirements for ownership and
control; and 3) those who maintain "compromise" registries,
that is, they set some conditions for registration but do not require the same level of connection between owners/operators
and the State as closed registers do. s The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (hereinafter "UNCTAD")
draws a distinction between what it calls "international registries" where the proportion of vessels owned by nationals of the
Id. at 3.
KX. Li and J. Wonham, 1999, "New Developments in Ship Registration", 14
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 137.
7
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flag State is at least thirty percent, and "open registries" where
the share owned by nationals of the flag State is ten percent or
less." The International Transport Workers' Federation (hereinafter "ITF") defines flags of convenience simply as those who
"rent out their flags to ship owners seeking to evade their own
country's rules.»!o
In assessing the prevalence of fishing vessels flying flags of
convenience, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (hereinafter "FAO") used a combination of
these standards to identify thirty-two open registry States that
include or have included fishing vessels, as of March 2002 - a
sharp increase from eleven in 1980. 11 Likewise, the number of
fishing vessels on open registries has risen in recent years; in
1998 they constituted about ten percent of the world's fishing
fleet but grew to about 12.5 percent in 2001. 12 Because many of
these vessels re-flag multiple times within a year, or even·
maintain more than one registration, Lloyds Maritime Information Services listed over 1,300 fishing vessels flying an "unknown flag" in 2001, a sharp increase from only fourteen in
1998. 13
By definition, flag of convenience fishing vessels have little
or no connection to the territory of their state of registry. It
follows, then, that these vessels do not fish in the EEZ of their
flag; as the ITF asserts, "there is little to be gained from registering a fishing vessel within an FOe, apart from either being
able to circumvent the applicable management regime or to
fish illegally."14 States that offer open registries to fishing ves9 UNCTAD
Secretariat,
Review
of
Maritime
Transport,
2003
(UNCTADIRMT/2003), 54.
10 International Transport Workers' Federation, 2003, Steering the Right Course:
Towards an Era of Responsible Flag States and Effective International Governance of
Oceans and Seas, 11.
11 Judith Swan, 2002, Fishing Vessels Operating under Open Registers and the
Exercise of Flag State Responsibilities. Information and Options, FAO Fisheries Circular 980, 4 and App. 1. Most sources concur that Belize, Panama, Honduras, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines top the list of major fisheries flags of convenience.
12 ITF 2003 at 25.
13 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Trade Union Advisory
Committee to the OECD, International Transport Workers' Federation, and Greenpeace International, 2002, More Troubled Waters: Fishing, Pollution and FOCs, Major
group submission for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg,
26 Aug. - 6 Sept. 2002, 18, though some of these vessels may have been removed from
their original registers prior to being scrapped. See SOFIA at 21.
14 More Troubled Waters, supra at 19.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss3/3

4

Warner-Kramer: Control Begins at Home

CONTROL BEGINS AT HOME

2004]

501

sels rarely offer much in the way of monitoring and control over
those vessels. Few of the most notorious flag of convenience
States are members of the regional fisheries management organizations charged with the maintenance of the stocks these
vessels target. And none has ratified the major international
instruments governing fisheries on the high seas.
The lack of oversight by open registries does not just jeopardize sustainable fisheries management; vessels flying these
flags are also much more likely to ignore other standards. Of
the major open registries, only Panama has enacted national
legislation covering each of the existing standards set by the
International Labour Organization for work in the fisheries
sector.lS The safety and environmental protection track record
of these vessels is also poor - in 2001, seven of the top ten flag
states for ship detentions in ports of countries party to the
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
were open registries. These vessels accounted for 774 of just
over 1000 total detentions. Recent investigations are also uncovering increasing evidence that these vessels are connected
through their beneficial owners to international criminal networks.
IUU fishing by vessels flying flags of convenience undermines international efforts to conserve and manage shared
fisheries resources, disadvantages legitimate fishers, jeopardizes food security, and is often associated with a general disregard for labor rights and environmental protection. The past
decade has seen concerted efforts to find ways to address these
problems within international law. The international community has searched for a way to compel flag States to fulfill their
16

17

18

15 See generally International Labour Office, 2003, Conditions of Work in the
Fishing Sector. A Comprehensive Standard (a Convention Supplemented by a Recommendation) on Work in the Fishing Sector, Report V (1) for the 92 nd Session of the International Labour Conference, 1 - 17 June 2004. (On file with the author)
16 More Troubled Waters, supra note 13, at 12.
17 Gavin Hayman and Duncan Brack, 2002, International Environmental Crime:
The Nature and Control of Environmental Black Markets, Report of the Royal Institute
ofInternational Affairs experts workshop of the same name, London, 27 - 28 May 2002.
(On file with the author)
18 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002, "Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing", FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No.9, 1 [hereinafterFAO).
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duties to control these vessels or, when they cannot or will not
do so, to find a way to act in their stead.

II.

FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE EXCLUSMTY OF
FLAG STATE JURISDICTION

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (hereinafter ''UNCLOS")'9 codified two principles of customary international law - the fundamental freedom of the
high seas and the exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. Neither of these principles is, however,
absolute. The freedom to use the high seas is to be exercised
with due regard for both "the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas" and "the rights under
this Convention with respect to activities" on the high seas:O
Article 92 allows exceptions to exclusive flag State jurisdiction
both under other parts of UNCLOS itself and under other international treaties.
Even in some of its earliest articulations, the concept of
free access to the oceans was conditioned on the need for some
degree of order on the high seas:' Particularly for fisheries, as
more and more nations began in the 1950's to build fleets capable of harvesting on the high seas, the principle of open use
began to evolve into one of reasonable use. 22 The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas (1958 Fishing Convention),23 one of four treaties that
grew out of the UN's efforts, through the International Law
Commission, to codify international law relating to the oceans,
tempered the freedom to fish on the high seas with the recognition of the rights of other states to do the same. At the same
time, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (High
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,21 ILM 1245, in force
November 1994 [hereinafter UNCLOS).
20 UNCLOS Article 87.
21 UN "Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas" UN Document AlCN.4132,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950,69.
22 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, "The International Law of High Seas Fisheries:
From Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable Use," Governing High Seas Fisheries: The
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, 24, (Olav Schram Stokke, ed. 2001).
23 Ckneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, 559 United Nations Treaty Series 285 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Fishing
Convention). This Convention entered into force in 1966, but it was never ratified by
several major fishing States (e.g.. Canada, Japan, China, Iceland, Norway).
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Seas Convention)24 set a broad standard that the high seas were
open to all nations, whether coastal or not, though this freedom
"shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the
interest of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.'''5
If, as stated in Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, "no
State may validly purport to subject any part of [the high seas]
to its sovereignty," it follows that, with few exceptions, no State
has the right to prevent another from using the high seas, or to
exert its jurisdiction over another State's vessel on the high
seas!6 A vessel can therefore be viewed as a floating piece of
the territory of the nation whose flag it flies; save in specific
circumstance such as piracy or the existence of an international
treaty to the contrary, a flag State has the same exclusive right
to exercise legal and enforcement jurisdiction over its vessels
on the high seas as over its own territory.27
In 1956, the International Law Commission emphasized
the fundamental role of exclusive flag State jurisdiction to the
maintenance of order on the high seas, noting that the "absence
of any authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to
chaos. One of the essential adjuncts to the principle of the
freedom of the seas is that a ship must fly the flag of a single
State.'>2B The High Seas Convention acknowledged this point in
Article 6(1)29 and UNCLOS lifted the language of this Article
almost verbatim into Article 92.
With the rights of exclusive jurisdiction came responsibilities to exercise that jurisdiction effectively to preserve the order of the high seas. The High Seas Convention laid out a few
responsibilities for flag States to, inter alia, take necessary
measures to ensure safety at sea, prevent pollution, and punish
24 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 450 United Nations Treaty Series 11
(1958) [hereinafter High Seas Convention).
25 Id. at Art. 2.
26 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, 1999, The Law of the Sea, 3'" ed., 166.
27 See Rachel Canty, 1998, "Limits of Coast Guard Authority to Board Foreign
Flag Vessels on the High Seas," 23 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 125.
28 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventh session, 23 April - 4 July 1956 (UN Doc. Al3159), in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1956, Vol. II (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.AlI956/Add.I), 279.
29 "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 3

504

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

the transport of slaves. 30 But UNCLOS built upon those requirements by including, in Article 94, both a general exhortation to all States to "effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social mattes over ships
flying its flag" and a specific, though not exhaustive, list of flag
state duties.
UNCLOS also brought in aspects of the 1958 Fishing Convention related to flag states' duties to adopt measures for the
conservation of fisheries resources on the high seas and to cooperate with other states in the same. However, in establishing the regime of the EEZ, UNCLOS expanded these principles, setting out specific duties to cooperate in the management
of particular stocks, such as anadromous or highly migratory
species, that occur both on the high seas and in coastal States'
internal waters or EEZs.31 It also reinforced the duty to conserve resources on the high seas through specifying an obligation to determine total allowable catch within and beyond the
EEZs and take "such measures for their respective nationals as
may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of
the high seas."32
The responsibility of a flag state to control its vessels and
cooperate with other States as an essential complement to exclusive flag State jurisdiction was central to the global fisheries
instruments that grew out of UNCLOS in the 1990s. First,
while noting that "the adoption, monitoring and enforcement of
effective conservation measures, is inadequate in many areas,"
the 1992 Cancun Declaration instructed the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to take the lead in creating a code of
conduct for responsible fisheries. 33 The Code, finalized in 1995,
is a voluntary instrument that, nonetheless, includes specific
flag State duties not only to cooperate in the sustainable management of fisheries resources but also to "take enforcement
measures in respect of fishing vessels entitled to fly their flag
See, e.g., High Seas Convention Articles 10, 13, 24, and 25.
31 See generally UNCLOS Article 63-67 for provisions dealing with straddling,
highly migratory, anadromous, and catadromous stocks, as well as marine mammals.
32 UNCLOS Article 117. See generally Articles 116-120 regarding conservation
and management of the living resources of the high seas.
33 Declaration of the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancun,
Mexico, 6-8 May 1992, available at http://wwwoceanlaw.netitexts/cancun.htm (last
visited March 17, 2004).
30
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which have been found by them to have contravened applicable
conservation and management measures.""
The Cancun Declaration also called upon states to "take effective action, consistent with international law, to deter reflagging of vessels as a means of avoiding compliance with applicable conservation and management rules for fishing activities on the high seas." This was echoed in the Agenda 21 chapter on the oceans adopted during the UN Conference on Environment and Development,3S and resulted in the negotiation of
the FAO Compliance Agreement in 1993. 36 The Compliance
Agreement fully elaborates the responsibilities of flag States
whose vessels fish on the high seas, in particular establishing a
requirement that each such vessel must have an authorization
to fish issued by its flag State. 37
Although its fundamental premise is the primary jurisdiction of the flag state over its vessels fishing on the high seas,
and the duties that comprise the exercise of that jurisdiction,as
the Compliance Agreement also calls upon all states to cooperate in regard to vessels that do not fulfill the obligation to comply with agreed international measures. Much of this cooperation is to be effected through information exchange facilitated
by the FAO; specifically, through a database of all registered
fishing vessels over 24 meters in length. 39 The cooperation
should also be bilateral; Article V also states that non-flag
States may make a determination that a vessel in its port has
engaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and ma..'1agement measures. But it also
.. FAO, 1995, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Art. 8.2.7.
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, 3 - 4 June 1992 (UN Doc. AlCONF.151126, Vol. II) Agenda 21, para.
17.52.
36 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 1993, 33 lLM 969, in force
April 2003 !hereinafter Compliance Agreementl.
37 ld. at Art. 111.2. This requirement may be waived by flag States for vessels
less than 24 meters in length, but only if the State determines such an exemption
would not "undermine the object and purpose" of the Agreement. ld. at Art. 11.2.
as [d. at Art. 111.3 "No Party shall authorize any fishing vessel entitled to fly its
flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless the Party is satisfied that it is able,
taking into account the links that exist between it and the fishing vessel concerned, to
exercise effectively its responsibilities under this Agreement in respect of that fishing
vesseL"
39 [d. at Art. VI.
35

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 3

506

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

goes on to say that the next step after such a determination is
to notify the flag state and make arrangements what additional
investigation, if any, the port state may undertake. Presumably, if the flag state is unwilling or unable to exert effective
control over the vessel, under the Compliance Agreement, the
port State has little recourse to further action.
The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement'1O echoes
the general concept of flag State responsibility contained in the
Compliance Agreement and UNCLOS before it. But the Fish
Stocks Agreement allows less discretion to flag States and explicitly, in Article 18(1), requires compliance with subregional
and regional conservation and management measures.') Notably, it was the first global instrument to spell out circumstances - other than those specified by an international
agreement or treaty - where a non-flag state may take action
against a vessel undermining the effectiveness of international
fisheries conservation and management measures. Article
21(1) allows States party to the Fish Stocks Agreement and
also a member of a regional fisheries organization or arrangement to board and inspect fishing vessels of any other State
party to the Fish Stocks Agreement, whether or not that State
is a member of the regional body in question. In essence, states
party to the Fish Stocks Agreement are bound to apply even
conservation and management measures adopted under a regional agreement to which it is not a party." Article 20(7) further allows states party to the Fish Stocks Agreement and
members of regional bodies or arrangements to take actions, in
accordance with international law, "to deter vessels which have
engaged in activities which undermine the effectiveness of or
otherwise violate the conservation and management measures
established by that organization or arrangement from fishing
on the high seas ... until such time as appropriate action is
taken by the flag State."

.0 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995,
34 ILM 1542, in force December 2001 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement) .
•) Budislav Vukas & Davor Vidas, "Flags of Convenience and High Seas Fishing:
The Emergence of a Legal Framework" 69 (Olav Schram Stokke ed., 2001) .
• 2 Id. at 76.
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The result is an affirmative duty beyond the general obligation for flag states to cooperate in earlier instruments; that
is, under the Fish Stocks Agreement, no one can fish in a high
seas area covered by a regional organization except through the
regional organization or by observing the conservation and
management rules established by the organization:a The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU-IPOA),"
adopted by FAO in 2001 as one of four voluntary plans of action
developed within the framework of the Code of Conduct, reiterated this principle in regard to all states; states have a responsibility to ensure that their nationals, not just vessels, comply
with relevant fisheries conservation and management measures:" Since negotiation of the Fish Stocks Agreement, many
regional fisheries management organizations have given effect
to this principle through measures that seek the compliance of
both members and non-members.

III. A "GENUINE LINK"
As described above, recent global fisheries instruments
have elaborated the responsibility of a flag state to maintain
effective control over its vessels on the high Seas and, increasingly, have acknowledged circumstances whereby other states
may act if the flag State cannot or will not exercise that control. But an important consideration in regard to a flag state's
ability to control its vessels fishing on the high seas is what
standards, if any, exist governing the conditions under which a
State grants its flag in the first place.
In general, international law has held that States have the
discretion to determine how and why they grant their nationality to ships. In 1905, the Permanent Court of Arbitration noted
43 Satya Nandan "The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and its Potential Impact on Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries," statement made at the Conference on Achieving Goals for Sustainable Living in
the Aquatic Continent, Hawaii, 19 - 23 Sept. 1995, cited in Vicuna, supra note 22 at 42.
44 See supra note 4.
45 See e.g. id. at para. 17, "In the light of relevant provisions of the 1982 UN
Convention, and without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the flag State on the
high seas, each State should, to the greatest extent possible, take measures or cooperate to ensure that nationals subject to their jurisdiction do not support or engage in
IUU fishing. All States should cooperate to identify those nationals who are the operators or beneficial owners of vessels involved in IUU fishing."
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that, "it belongs to every sovereign to decide to whom he will
accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules governing such grants."" This sentiment was also expressed by
the special rapporteur for the Law of the Sea in his 1950 report
to the International Law Commission, but he further went on
to note that no State's standards should differ from those in
common practice."
An early draft of the text that would become Article 5(1) of
the High Seas Convention set out unambiguous criteria for determining the "national character" of a ship, specifically that
the vessel must either be property of the state in question or be
at least 50 percent owned by a national, partnership, or company of that state. 48 In the comments accompanying this draft,
the International Law Commission noted a parallel between
granting nationality to a person and issuing registration to a
vessel and further highlighted a concern that "control and jurisdiction by a state over ships flying its flag can only be effectively exercised when there is in fact a relationship between
the state and the ship other than that based on mere registration."49
In the end, Article 5(1) of the High Seas Convention enshrined the notion that each State determines the terms for
granting its nationality to ships, registering ships in its territory, and allowing vessels to fly its flag. But it goes on to require a "genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over
ships flying its flag."
What constitutes a "genuine link" has been the subject of
considerable debate ever since. It is not a term with established meaning in international law. The High Seas Convention was the first to use it; it does not appear in any other con46 Muscat Dhows (France v. Great Britain), 2 AJIL 921, 924 cited in Churchill
and Lowe, supra note 26, 205.
47 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its second session,
5 June to 29 July 1950 (UN Doc. Al1316) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.Al1950/Add.1).

46 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its seventh session, 2 May to 8
July 1955 (UN Doc. N2934), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1955, Vol.

I, (UN Doc. AlCN.4ISER.Al1955).
49 Yearbook
of the International Law Commission,
AlCN.4ISER.Al1955/Add. 1), 23 (1955).
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ventions dealing with nationality of individuals or aircraft.
One clue as to the intention may be found in Article 6(1) High
Seas Convention, which states, "a ship may not change its flag
during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a
real transfer of ownership or a change of registry." The implication of the phrase "real transfer of ownership" of the vessel
suggests the registration of the vessel and the owner's real
connection with the State of nationality are directly related: 1
In UNCLOS, which separates the provisions dealing with
the granting of nationality from those describing flag State duties/ 2 the meaning of the "genuine link" requirement is even
less clear (though the notion of "real change of ownership" persists in Article 92). By the early 1990s, concerns over the detrimental effects of fishing vessels re-flagging to avoid compliance with conservation and management rules revived interest
in clarifying what constituted a genuine link between flag state
and vessel.
The original focus of the FAO conference that led to the
creation of the Compliance Agreement was to come to agreement on means to deter re-flagging, and in fact the initial draft
had provisions instructing a State to refuse to grant its flag to
a fishing vessel unless it was "satisfied, in accordance with its
own national legislation, that there exists a genuine link.""
The draft went on to set criteria for determining such a link,
including the nationality or residence of the owners. Disagreement over how, or even whether, the new agreement
should address issues of registration and the nature of the
genuine link led negotiators to shift the focus of the final
Agreement from re-flagging to flag State responsibility. 54
50

For a thorough study of the legal interpretation of the "genuine link" requirements in both UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention, see Robin R. Churchill with
Christopher Hedley, 2000, The Meaning of the "Genuine Link" Requirement in Relation
to the Nationality of Ships, study prepared for the International Transport Workers
Federation, available at http://www.oceanlaw.netlhedley/pubs/ITF-Oct2000. pdf (last
visited March 17, 2004).
51 Id . at 13.
52 UNCLOS Art. 91 deals with nationality of ships; Art. 94 as noted above addresses flag State duties .
.. Draft Agreement on the Flagging of Vessels Fishing on the High Seas to Promote Compliance with Internationally Agreed Conservation and Management Measures, Art. IVO) (FAO Document COFII93110, Annex 2).
54 David A. Balton, "The Compliance Agreement," Developments in International
Fisheries Law, 31 (Ellen Hey, ed. 1999).
50
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As noted above, the Compliance Agreement deals with the

issuance of an authorization to fish on the high seas and the
elaboration of the duties of the flag state granting that authorization. Its only remaining nod to the "genuine link" requirement is in Article lips where flag States are directed to assess
their ability to exercise control over their vessels before issuing
authorizations to fish on the high seas.
It remains, however, that meaningful flag State control is
very difficult where vessels operate far from the flag state and
may, in fact, never have any contact with the territory or officials of the flag state. As one author notes, in appearing to
sidestep the "genuine link" issue, focusing instead on the issue
of flag State responsibility, international law leaves considerable room for flag of convenience fishing vessels to undermine
international conservation and management efforts with impunity. Unless international fisheries instruments are widely
implemented, the problems identified at the root of IUD fishing
remain. 56
IV. REGIONAL INITIATIVES

At the same time the international community was realizing the need to build on the general provisions in UNCLOS to
elaborate a new regime for international fisheries, regional
fisheries management organizations (hereinafter "RFMOs")
began to develop their own initiatives. Efforts to bolster conservation and management measures went hand-in-hand with
a push to compel all states fishing for the stocks under their
purview to comply.
From the beginning, the focus of their efforts were the vessels of non-contracting parties, specifically those flagged to
states offering open registries and little oversight or control.
Two types of mechanisms have evolved within the various
RFMOs: trade-based measures that attempt to limit access to
markets of IUD-caught fish, and enforcement-based measures
55

S ee supra note 38.

56 A. Van Houtte, 2003, "Flag State Responsibility and the Contribution of Recent International Instruments in Preventing, Deterring, and Eliminating IUU Fishing," as presented to the Expert Consultation on Fishing Vessels Operating Under
Open Registries and their Impact on megal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing,
Miami, Fl. 23 - 25 Sept. 2003, FAD Fisheries Report No. 722, 59 (on file with the author).
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that establish a presumption of illegal fishing and mandate
inspections and other enforcement actions to prevent IUUcaught fish from being landed.
In general, trade-based measures have been most widely
used where either the final market or the area of the fishery for
the fish products in question are very limited. Enforcementbased measures were originally developed in RFMOs where
either the market patterns or the nature of the fisheries themselves are too complicated to allow easy trade tracking.
As the problems of IUU fishing have continued to grow,
more and more RFMOs have expanded the tools at their disposal to combat them. Most RFMOs are now moving towards
an integrated suite of both trade-based and enforcement-based
measures to prevent fishing by non-members. Further, as different RFMOs have had some success in halting IUU fishing by
non-members, there is an even bigger priority being placed on
equivalent measures to address problems caused by members'
fleets.

1.

ICCAT

The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (hereinafter "ICCAT") was the first RFMO to
tackle the problems of non-member fishing in a comprehensive
way. At its 1991 Annual Meeting, the Commission had noted
the presence of many non-member vessels targeting ICCATmanaged stocks, particularly Western Atlantic bluefin tuna. 57
Many of these vessels were flagged to States with open registries, such as Panama, Honduras, and Belize, who maintained
little or no control over the fishing vessels flying their flag. At
the time, scientific advice showing that bluefin tuna stocks
were continuing to decline 58 also led ICCAT to adopt a four-year
57 Hoping to curb this non-member fishing, ICCAT adopted 91-2, "Resolution by
ICCAT Concerning Catches of Bluefin Tuna by Non-Contracting Parties," which called
for developing comprehensive management policies designed to improve reporting and
ensure ICCAT compliance through standardizing statistical reporting and an international trade monitoring system. The new policies were also to include "other measures
... consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
58 The situation was so bad that, shortly after the 1991 ICCAT meeting, Sweden
announced its plans to introduce a proposal to list Atlantic bluefin tuna under the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES). See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, Japan, March 1992.
Sweden's proposal would have recommended that Western Atlantic bluefin tuna be
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"enhancement" of current management measures for western
Atlantic bluefin tuna, as a first step toward a recovery program
for that stock:9 Given the high levels of fishing by nonmembers - estimates at the time indicated approximately
twenty percent of total landings of north Atlantic bluefin tuna
came from vessels of non-membersso - there was a clear realization that the proposed restrictions on harvests by ICCAT
parties would be insufficient without a accompanying reduction
in non-member fishing.
ICCAT followed up in 1992 by taking two steps towards
exerting control over non-member fishing. The first was the
establishment of a system to track trade of frozen bluefin tuna.
The Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program required any
bluefin tuna product imported into the territory of a Contracting Party to be accompanied by a document that, among others,
indicated the country issuing the document, names of the importer and exporter, and the area of harvest. The document
had to be validated by a government official of the flag state of
the vessel that harvested the tuna:· In requiring all imports
into ICCAT member countries to be documented, it effectively
bound even non-members to comply with ICCAT. The vast majority of Atlantic bluefin tuna entering trade is destined for
ICCAT member - country markets. Japan alone is the recipient
of more than ninety percent of the total Atlantic blue fin tuna in
61

listed on CITES Appendix I, which would have prevented all international trade, and
Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna (assessed to be in slightly better shape) be listed on
CITES Appendix II, which, among other restrictions, would have required all trade to
be documented and tracked. It was withdrawn before it could come to a vote.
59 91 _1 , "Recommendation by ICCAT (Made in 1991) for the Enhancement of the
Current Management of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna." In its 1992 bluefin tuna
stock assessment, the scientific body ofICCAT estimated that Western Atlantic bluefin
tuna populations had fallen to about ten percent of their 1975 levels.
so See Report of the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, 155
(1992).
61 92_1, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program." The requirement was originally limited to frozen products
only, then expanded to fresh bluefin tuna the following year. See 93-3, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Implementation of the ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical
Document Program on Fresh Products."
6. This was later expanded to include designated non-governmental institutions,
but only for members of the Commission "in good standing" who provided ICCATrequired statistical information. See 93-1 "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning Validation
by a Government Official of the Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document."
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trade63 - so non-contracting parties who did not utilize the statistical document effectively lost access to all international
markets. Implementation of the statistical document therefore
gave the first clear picture of the true levels of both member
and non-member fishing for blue fin tuna, and, most usefully,
allowed ICCAT to identify which non-member countries were
fishing at levels that could jeopardize ICCAT's attempts to
manage the stocks.
The second innovation of the 1992 ICCAT Annual Meeting
was the creation of a new subsidiary body to administer and
oversee the new statistical document program and, more generally, track fishing by non-members and make recommendations to ICCAT based upon its review. The terms of reference
also included a specific mandate "to consider and outlining
measures to prevent the re-flagging of vessels of Contracting
Parties for the purpose of avoiding fisheries management
measures established by the Commission."64 In its 1991 resolution concerning non-contracting party fishing,65 ICCAT had already noted that problems in data collection and stock assessment had been exacerbated by a significant number of contracting party vessels re-flagging to non-member states. Many of
the subsequent measures ICCAT developed therefore had the
effect of bringing those contracting parties' vessels that had
attempted to evade ICCAT by re-flagging to open registries
back into compliance with ICCAT.
With a way to track trade and a better understanding of
the quantities and origins of much of the unreported catch,
ICCAT fulfilled the final mandate of the 1991 resolution with
its 1994 adoption of the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan. 66 The action
plan established a process by which ICCAT identified States
whose vessels fished for Atlantic bluefin tuna "in a manner
which diminishes the effectiveness" of ICCAT conservation and

63 According to 2002 Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document data, Japan imported
almost ninety-five percent of all Atlantic bluefin tuna tracked by the program. Other
importers include the United States, the European Union, and Korea.
64 92-2, "Resolution by ICCAT to Establish a Permanent Working Group for the
Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures and the Terms of Reference of the Working Group."
65 See supra at note 57.
66 93-2 "Resolution by ICCAT on the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan."
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management measures. 67 ICCAT was to request the identified
States to rectify the situation. If, in the next year, the vessels
continued to undermine ICCAT, the action plan allowed ICCAT
to recommend that its Contracting Parties take additional
measures, including multilateral import restrictions, on bluefin
tuna products from the flag State.
The very next year, ICCAT identified Panama, Belize, and
Honduras68 under the new plan and, in 1996, agreed to impose
trade sanctions against all three. After a parallel scheme covering Atlantic swordfish was adopted in 1995,69 these same
three states were identified as undermining ICCAT's swordfish
management efforts as well. Belize and Honduras were eventually subject to import bans on Atlantic swordfish. 70
These actions had immediate effects. In 1995, when it was
first identified under the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan, Panama
had almost 600 fishing vessels on its registry. By 1999, the
year that sanctions were lifted upon Panama's joining ICCAT
that number had fallen by almost 60 percent. Largely in response to ICCAT's actions, Panama issued new regulations
regulating the issuance of international fishing licenses and
establishing grounds for cancellation of the license, including
"proven violation of the conservation and management measures of regional and sub-regional fishery organizations.""
In that same period, there were two other important developments. The first was a surge in fishing vessels registered
7l

67 This standard comes from the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective
Act of 1971 (22 U.S.C. 1978), which directs the required the Secretary of Commerce to
determine if nationals of a foreign country are diminishing the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program; such a determination can lead to import
prohibitions on fish products from the offending nation. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement utilized similar language ("undermine the effectiveness" vice "diminish") in its
call for States to ensure their fishing activities are consistent with subregional or regional conservation and management measures. See Article 17 at para. 4.
68 96-11, "Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant
to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan" and 96-12, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning
Panama Pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan."
69 95_13, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning an Action Plan to Ensure the Effectiveness of the Conservation Program for Atlantic Swordfish."
70 99_8 , "Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Belize and Honduras Pursuant
to the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan Resolution." Although Panama was identified with
Belize and Honduras under the Swordfish Action Plan in 1998, it had joined the Commission by the 1999 ICCAT annual meeting and therefore was no longer subject to the
action plans.
7l SOFIA at Figure 37,66.
7. Panamanian Executive Decree No. 49 (of 13 November 1997), Article 7.
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to Belize, inversely proportional to the decline in Panama's registry.73 The second was a sharp increase in unreported catches
of some other ICCAT-managed species, particularly bigeye
tuna." As Panama began to impose discipline on its registry,
and as markets for bluefin tuna were closed to the three biggest non-member fleets, IUU vessels sought either a new flag, a
new fishery, or both.
Recognizing that, particularly in the case of highly mobile
large-scale longline vessels, stock-specific measures merely
routed the IUU fleet into new fisheries, ICCAT adopted a new
measure in 1998 to identify States - ICCAT members or nonmembers alike - whose large scale longline vessels undermined the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation and management measures. 75 As with the action plans, the new resolution
could eventually result in the imposition of trade restrictions,
but in this case, the sanctions could apply to any species
ICCAT identified as being harmed by the fishing activities in
question. To facilitate its application, the UU Catches Resolution instructed ICCAT members to submit to the Commission
information on vessels supplying imports of frozen tuna or
swordfish.
ICCAT adopted its first list of IUU vessels pursuant to the
UU Catches Resolution at its 1999 Annual Meeting. 76 It included 345 longline vessels, the vast majority of which were
flagged to Belize, Honduras, Equatorial Guinea, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. By 2002, the list totaled 378, but for
fully 222 of those, the current flag was unknown. Once again,
vessels were fleeing the registries of states under sanction and
moving to another open registry.77 Further, a Japanese analysis of import data, comparing alleged vessel catch rates and
S ee supra note 71.
,. See Report of the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics
73

(2003), BET Fig. 2,31.
75 98 _18, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated
Catches of Tunas by Large-Scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area" [hereinafter
UU Catches Resolutionl.
76 ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 1998-99, Part II (1999) - Vol. 1, Appendix 11 to Annex 7.
77 Belize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Honduras, Sierra
Leone, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have each been sanctioned under this resolution; sanctions have subsequently been lifted from Belize, Honduras, and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines.
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ownership connections, showed that some vessel owners were
"laundering" catch made by one vessel flagged to a state under
sanction to another of the company's vessels under a "clean"
flag. 78
Clearly, actions focused at the flag State level were not
enough to tackle IUD fishing in such a fluid environment. To
counter, ICCAT adopted two vessel-based initiatives in 2002.
The ICCAT Positive Lise" built upon an existing call for all
ICCAT members to submit lists of their vessels over twentyfour meters licensed to fish in the ICCAT Convention Area for
stocks under ICCAT's purview. The new recommendation
however, was a binding measure that included clear requirements for flag states to maintain control over and a connection
to the vessels it submitted to the record - in effect setting up
an ICCAT-specific "genuine link." It also instructed ICCAT
members to take measures "to prohibit the fishing for, the retaining on board, the transshipment and landing" of tuna from
vessels not on the record,so and only to validate statistical
documents for listed vessels. As the statistical document program had been expanded to include swordfish and bigeye tuna
the year before, this effectively meant that, for the three highest-valued ICCAT stocks, no product caught by non-contracting
parties to ICCAT could enter trade.
This measure was complemented by the adoption of a
Negative List81 that built upon the IUD list instituted under
the UD Catches Resolution. In addition to formalizing the
process for compiling the list each year, this recommendation
instructed ICCAT members to, inter alia, prohibit landings,
transshipment, and imports from vessels on the list. Although
the Negative List initially includes only large-scale vessels of
non-contracting parties, it is intended to be expanded to all
vessels and all States in the next year.

78 See ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03, Part [ (2002) - Vol. 1, Appendix 1 to Annex 12.
7" 02-22, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Establishment of an
ICCAT Record of Vessels over 24 Meters Authorized to Operate in the Convention
Area."
so [d. at paragraph 7 a).
81 02_23, "Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to
Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the
ICCAT Convention Area."
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Finally, at its most recent annual meeting, ICCAT adopted
a new, comprehensive measure that replaced the Bluefin Tuna
Action Plan, the Swordfish Action Plan, and the UU Catches
Resolution."2 The new resolution sets a single process for enforcing all ICCAT conservation and management measures,
replacing the piecemeal approach to using trade as a compliance tool that evolved over the past decade. It applies to both
ICCAT members and non-members - members can be identified for not "taking measures or exercising effective control to
ensure compliance with ICCAT conservation and management
measures by the vessels flying their flag" and non-members are
held to a similar standard, based on their obligation not to undermine the effectiveness of ICCAT measures. In so doing, it
overcomes one of the biggest weaknesses of the old regime;
there was no way to continue sanctions imposed under the former Action Plans once the sanctioned State joined ICCAT.83
Most significantly, it gives binding effect to non-members' duty
to cooperate enunciated in the Fish Stocks Agreement and
UNCLOS before it.

2.

Other Tuna Organizations

Other organizations whose mandate include highlymigratory stocks, such as the Commission for the Conservation
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (lOTC), and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC), have taken a similar approach to ICCAT
in recent years. All three have adopted some kind of statistical
document program84 coupled with a positive listing scheme
82 03_15, "Resolution by ICCAT Concerning Trade Measures," available at
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Recs/Recs2003/2003-15-e.pdf (last visited March 17,
2004).
83 When Panama became a contracting party in late 1998, ICCAT lifted the sanctions imposed under the Bluefin Tuna Action Plan, which applied only to noncontracting parties. At the time, several ICCAT members expressed serious concerns
that Panama had not, in fact, rectified the problems that led to the sanctions. Indeed,
in 2001 ICCAT identified Panama under the UU Catches Resolution after noting that a
number of fishing vessels deleted from Panama's registry had returned and appeared
to be undermining ICCAT's bigeye tuna measures.
84 See CCSBT "Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program", Attachment J to the Report of the Sixth Meeting (Second Part) of the CCSBT, March 2000;
IOTC "Resolution 01106 Concerning the IOTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document Programme"; IATTC C-03-01 "Resolution on IATTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document
Program."
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nearly identical to that of ICCAT for vessels over twenty-four
meters in length. 8s The result of this coordination is that, with
the exception of those in the Central and Western Pacific
Ocean, most bluefin and bigeye tuna fisheries and all major
markets are off-limits to states who are not members of the
relevant RFMO. When the Convention on the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean enters into force, this loophole
will close.
To date, only CCSBT has also adopted a scheme to impose
trade-restrictive measures on non-members whose vessels are
identified as catching southern bluefin tuna in a manner that
diminishes the effectiveness of the relevant conservation and
management measures. 87 Since its adoption in 2000, CCSBT
has identified Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, Seychelles, and
Equatorial Guinea under the plan, but has not moved to the
imposition of trade sanctions against any of these states.
88

3.

North Atlantic

The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)
was plagued by a serious non-member fishing problem from
shortly after its inception in 1979. From the mid-1980s to the
early 1990s, more than 30 non-member vessels were spotted in
the NAFO Regulatory Area each year; most of these were
flagged to open registry States such as Panama, Honduras, and
Sierra Leone. This coincided with the organization contemplating drastic cutbacks in key groundfish fisheries like cod as
many of the major NAFO stocks began to flounder.
88

85 See CCSBT "Resolution megal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUD)
and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels over 24 Meters Authorized to Fish for
Southern Bluefin Tuna", Attachment 10 to Appendix 3 of the Report of the Tenth Meet·
ing of the CCSBT, October 2003; IOTC "Resolution 02105 Concerning the Establishment of an IOTC Record of Vessels over 24 Metres Authorised to Operate in the IOTC
Area"; IATTC C-03-07 "Resolution on the Establishment of a List of Longline Fishing
Vessels over 24 Meters (LSTLFVs) Authorized to Operate in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean."
88 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, done at Honolulu 5 September 2000.
87 CCSBT "Action Plan", Attachment I to the Report of the Sixth Meeting (Second
Part) of the CCSBT, March 2000.
88 See Annual Report of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 1985-93.
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In 1990, NAFO established a new body to monitor nonmember fishing and identify options to address the problem.
The terms of reference for this group included both a call to
prevent the re-flagging of NAFO member vessels to fish under
the flags of non -contracting parties and to examine means to
control imports of fish caught by non-members.89 That same
year, NAFO also adopted a resolution requesting its members
to deal directly with non-contracting parties fishing in NAFO
waters, both through diplomatic channels and by taking "effective measures to reduce the benefits of any fishing activities" of
those States' vessels. The resolution also contemplated the development of a certificate to accompany imports of all NAFOmanaged stocks taken by non-contracting parties indicating
the fish were not harvested within the NAFO area. 90
NAFO fisheries tend to be mixed - a certain percentage of
bycatch of other species are expected in most cases - and are
traded in a wide range of markets. The logistics of implementing a catch certification scheme or trying to control imports in
the NAFO context were too complicated. Rather than focus on
trade as the primary tool for compliance, as ICCAT had done,
NAFO instead built upon the port state control provisions of
the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement.
The resulting non-contracting party scheme,91 adopted in 1997,
first set a presumption that any non-contracting party vessel
sighted fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, or receiving
transshipped fish from any such vessel, is undermining the
effectiveness of NAFO conservation and management measures. The sighting information is then disseminated quickly to
all NAFO members and to the flag state, and if the vessel enters the port of any NAFO member it is subject to port inspection and barred from landing or transshipping its fish unless it
can demonstrate it was not caught in the Regulatory Area.
Implementation of the Scheme, coupled with a continuation of the diplomatic contacts between NAFO members and
89 See NAFO Proposal 3/90, "Proposal for Establishment of the Standing Committee on Fishing Activity of Non-Contracting Parties on the Regulatory Area
(STACFAC)."
90 1190, "Resolution of the General Council of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization on non-NAFO Fishing Activities, adopted by the General Council on 14
September 1990."
91 "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the
Conservation and Enforcement Measures Established by NAFO," NAFO/GC Doc. 97/6.
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the flag states of non-contracting party vessels, led to a significant drop-off in sightings. In 2000 and 2001, no non-member
vessels at all were seen fishing in the Regulatory Area. But in
2002, sightings resumed, this time in a newly-developed oceanic redfish fishery shared by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC):2 NEAFC had adopted an identical
non-contracting party scheme in 1999,93 and, as the same vessels were seen fishing in both areas, NAFO and NEAFC agreed
to share sighting information under the schemes.
Concern over the apparent resurgence of non-contracting
party fishing revived an interest in implementing additional
trade restrictive measures in NAFO and NEAFC. While NAFO
considered such a proposal at its 2003 meeting and will work
on it further in 2004,94 NEAFC adopted a revised noncontracting party scheme at its annual meeting in November
2003:5 This new measure, which replaces the former scheme,
maintains its predecessor's presumption applied to sighted
non-member vessels and prohibitions on landings and transshipments from those vessels following a port inspection. All
sighted vessels are now also placed on an "IUU vessel list" to be
publicized on the NEAFC website, and NEAFC parties are to,
inter alia, prohibit imports of any fish, whether or not caught
under NEAFC's jurisdiction, from vessels on the list. The
scheme takes the final step of providing for trade restrictive
measures on the flag states of listed vessels if they do not rectify the fishing activities of their vessels.

4.

CCAMLR

The fisheries managed by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) are
among the hardest to control and the most tempting for lUU
fishers to exploit. The size and isolation of the CCAMLR convention area - encompassing vast areas of the southern ocean
92 See NAFO Meeting Proceedings 2002, Part III, Report of the Standing Committee on Fishing Activity of Non-Contracting Parties on the Regulatory Area, 343 - 347.
93 "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with Recommendations Established by NEAFC," adopted November 1998.
94 See NAFO, Report of the General Council, 25'h Annual Meeting, 15 - 19 September 2003, NAFO/GC Doc. 03/3, 70 and Annex 6. (Advance copy, on file with the
author)
95 NEAFC Doc. AM 2003/34, in force 1 January 2004. (On file with the author)
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- makes traditional enforcement impossible. The chief fish
stocks under CCAMLR's purview, Patagonian toothfish and
Antarctic toothfish, only began being widely commercially exploited in the early 1990s,96 but by 1995 the unreported catch
was estimated to be at least equal to if not more than legal
catches. Once again, a major source of the IUU fishing was
flag of convenience vessels from states such as Panama and
Belize, and in particular vessels either owned by firms in
CCAMLR member states but flagged elsewhere or reflagged to
non-member states to avoid compliance with CCAMLR measures. 98 In this instance there were also significant numbers of
vessels from CCAMLR member countries like Russia and Uruguay fishing illegally.99
Two years later, CCAMLR members called for additional
action to improve compliance with conservation and management measures by both members and non-members. The first
measures focused on strengthening the ability of members to
control their own fleets ,100 and included mandatory licensing'°l
and mandatory use of satellite tracking systems l02 on all member vessels fishing in the CCAMLR zone. But CCAMLR also
adopted a non-contracting party scheme.103 Like the NAFO
Scheme adopted the same year, this measure established a
presumption that non-contracting party vessels sighted fishing
in the CCAMLR convention area were undermining CCAMLR
conservation and management measures, required a port inspection of any sighted vessels, and allowed members to prohibit landings or transshipments of toothfish found on board.
97

96 Mary Lack and Glenn Sant, 2001, "Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation
and Trade Measures Working?" TRAFFIC Bulletin Vol. 19 No.1, 3.
97 CCAMLR, 1995, Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission, 11.
98 Richard
Herr, "The International Regulation on Patagonian Toothfish:
CCAMLR and High Seas Management," 316 (Olav Schram Stokke, ed. 2001).
99 See, e.g.. CCAMLR, 2002, Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission, Annex 5, Report of the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection.
100 H
err, supra note 98, at note 53.
101 Conservation Measure 10-02 (2001) "Licensing and Inspection Obligations of
Contracting Parties with regard to their Flag Vessels Operating in the Convention
Area," originally adopted in 1997 as Conservation Measure 119/XVI.
102 Conservation Measure 10-04 (2002) "Automated Satellite-Linked Vessel
Monitoring Systems (VMS)", originally adopted in 1997 as Resolution 121XV1.
103 Conservation Measure 10-07 (2002) "Scheme to Promote Compliance by NonContracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures," originally adopted
in 1997 as Conservation Measure 118/XVI.
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Estimates of unreported catch began to fall after the implementation of these measures/04 but CCAMLR's most effective innovation to combat IUD fishing was the introduction of
its Catch Documentation Scheme (hereinafter "CDS") in 2000. '05
Unlike the tuna statistical documents adopted in ICCAT and
elsewhere, which only attached to a product once it entered
trade, the CDS covers all harvests of toothfish from CCAMLR
waters from the moment it comes on board. Vessels must fill in
a catch document for every harvest of toothfish to be landed or
transshipped and report the particulars of its trip and catches
to the flag State. The flag State then verifies if each harvest is
consistent with the vessel's fishing authorization; only shipments accompanied by a catch document thus confirmed can be
landed, transshipped or imported into member States. The
CDS, like the tuna tracking programs, serves to close the major
markets to illegally-caught fish, but it also affords members
more effective control of landings and, more importantly,
transshipments from their own vessels.
In recent years, CCAMLR has also strengthened its measures that deal with problem vessels. First, the non-contracting
party scheme was modified in 2002 to create an IUD list containing the vessels sighted or denied landing or transshipment
under the scheme. Second, CCAMLR adopted a new scheme
the same year that established an IUD list of contracting party
vessels as well. '06 In both instances, CCAMLR members may
now prohibit imports, as well as landings and transshipments,
from listed vessels and further may agree to impose trade sanctions on the flag states if they fail to rectify their vessels' illegal
fishing activities. Notably, the language of the new measures,
which build upon the original ICCAT model, is virtually identical to that just adopted in NEAFC and under consideration in
NAFO.

TRAFFIC Bulletin, supra note 96, 7.
Conservation Measure 10·05 (2002) "Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.," originally adopted in 1999 as Conservation Measure 170IXVIII.
106 Conservation Measure 10-06 (2002), "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures."
104

105

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss3/3

26

Warner-Kramer: Control Begins at Home

CONTROL BEGINS AT HOME

2004]
V.

523

NATIONAL EFFORTS

Recognizing that a large number of Japan- and Taiwanbuilt longline vessels had reflagged in the 1990's, Japan undertook to facilitate a program with Taiwan whereby these vessels
were either rolled back into Taiwan registry or scrapped. With
the backing of its government, a Japanese industry group
called the Organization for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna
Fisheries (hereinafter "OPRT"), concluded an agreement with
Taiwan's FOC Fishing Vessels Association to scrap up to sixtytwo Japanese-built former flag of convenience longliners by the
end of 2002 and re-register sixty-seven longliners to Taiwan by
the end of 2005. 107 As part of the arrangement, Taiwan agreed
to absorb the re-registered vessels without increasing the total
number of its tuna longline vessels currently in operation. The
program got off to a slow start, but as of November 2003, Japan
had scrapped forty-three former flag of convenience vessels and
Taiwan had accepted forty-seven back to its registry. In addition, Japan negotiated a Cooperative Management Framework
with Vanuatu and Seychelles to take an additional sixty-nine
former flag of convenience longline vessels onto their registries,
where they are now bound to comply with relevant conservation and management measures. lOB
Following the imposition of trade sanctions by ICCAT
members, both Belize and St. Vincent and the Grenadines enacted a series of regulatory and legislative changes to gain
greater control over their respective registries. By October
2002, Belize could report to ICCAT that it had deregistered 513
fishing vessels in the previous yearl09 and had created a new
high seas fisheries licensing regime 110 modeled on the principles
of the Compliance Agreement and IPOA-IUU. The new law
established a fisheries administration to work with Belize's
registration agency to administer the granting of fishing licenses, maintain catch reporting, and oversee enforcement. All
107

OPRT Press Release 2001106/01 (on file with the author).

lOB "Report on the Progress in the Measures to Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Large-Scale Tuna Longline Fishing Vessels" Submitted by Japan to the
18th Regular Meeting of ICCAT, November 2003, ICCAT Working Doc. No. PWG-051
(on file with the author).
109 Submission by the Observer from Belize to the PWG, Appendix 3 to Annex 11
of ICCAT, Report for the Biennial Period 2002-03, Part I (2002) - Voll.
110 See Belize High Seas Fishing Act, 31 January 2003.
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vessels fishing on the high seas must be authorized and, as of
October 2003, must complete and submit detailed catch and
effort reports. In 2003 sightings of Belizean vessels, fishing
illegally showed a dramatic drop across the board/ and ICCAT
agreed to allow sanctions on Belize to lift as of January 1,
H

2004.H2

St. Vincent's efforts were similar. H3 In 2001, it ceased registering any new high sea fishing vessels and began to develop
a comprehensive fisheries management administration. St.
Vincent's revised legislation and subsequent regulations 1l4 require the issuance of a high seas fishing authorization, mandatory satellite monitoring, observer coverage, and daily catch
reporting. It is also developing port inspection schemes with
agents in Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil, where the majority
of St. Vincent's high seas fleet lands its catch, although St.
Vincent hopes to have all of its vessels landing in its own territory when a port development project in Kingstown is complete.
Supported by a ninety percent reduction in albacore tuna
catches in 2002, ICCAT agreed to lift sanctions as of January
2004. 115

Each state made statements at the time that ICCAT
agreed to lift their respective sanctions committing to prevent
its vessels from targeting ICCAT stocks for which it had no
quota and to avoid registering and licensing IUU vessels. 116 St.
Vincent's statement contained a specific undertaking to give
"serious consideration to reduce fishing vessels owned by nonCARICOM nationals," in line with its intention to eventually
nationalize its fleet and have its fishing vessels land in its terIII See e.g., two sighted by NAFO, three on ICCAT's rrru list, and none on
CCAMLR's.
112 02-16, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Importation of Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna, Atlantic Swordfish, and Atlantic Bluefin Tuna and their Products from
Belize."
H3 The information in this paragraph comes from statements of St. Vincent and
the Grenadines to the 2001 to 2003 Annual Meetings ofICCAT and personal communications with the author.
H4 Merchant Shipping Act, as amended, July 2001, High Seas Fishing Act, September 2001, and High Seas Fishing Regulations, published 4 November 2003.
H5 02-20, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Trade Sanction against St.
Vincent and the Grenadines."
HS See "Statement of Belize," ICCAT 2003 Working Doc. PWG-134, and "Statement of St. Vincent and the Grenadines," ICCAT 2003 Working Doc. PWG-135 (on file
with the author).
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ritory. Belize on the other hand, continues to maintain an open
registry for fishing vessels, but it is attempting to impose monitoring and control on these vessels from a distance through the
use of satellite monitoring and port inspections conducted by
contracted agents.1l7
VI. GLOBAL FOLLOW-UP

The IPOA-IUU was adopted in June 2001 as a comprehensive "toolbox" of measures that states could take, both individually and collectively, to address the problem of IUU fishing. Among its provisions is a call for States to develop their
own national plans of action to achieve the objectives of the
IPOA-IUU and for FAO to biennially evaluate the progress towards its implementation. Since then, F AO has hosted two
expert consultations aimed at exploring more effective implementation of elements of the IPOA-IUU; one looked at
strengthening port State control1l8 and the other addressed fishing by open registries. 119 The former initiative would open a
new avenue for combating IUU fishing through regional port
state Memoranda of Understanding setting out conditions of
entry to ports or denying access to ports by foreign fishing vessels that have engaged in, or supported, IUU fishing. At its
Twenty-fifth session in February 2003, FAD's Committee on
Fisheries called for additional work on these issues and for
convening a technical consultation to review overall progress
and promote the full implementation of the IPOA-IUU; the latter session will be held in June 2004. 120
Outside the auspices of the FAD, other organizations have
initiatives underway that could provide innovative ways to
tackle IUU fishing in general, and the problems related to flag
of convenience fishing in particular. The Organization for Eco117 Per presentation by the observer from Belize to informal sessions of the PWG
at the 2003 ICCAT meeting, November 2003.
118 Report of the Expert Consultation to Review Port State Measures to Combat
megal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing - Rome, 4-6 November 2002, FAO Fisheries Report No. 692.
119 Report of the Expert Consultation on Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open
Registries and their Impact on megal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Miami,
Fl. Sep. 23-25, 2003, FAO Fisheries Report No. 722.
120 See Report of the Twenty-fifth session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome,
24-28 February 2003, FAO Fisheries Report No. 702, para. 23.
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nomic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter "OECD") is
in the midst of a multi-year project looking at the environmental, economic, and social issues and effects of IUU/flag of
convenience fishing. This project will build upon earlier work
that the OECD has done on the roles of subsidies and market
dynamics in sustainable fisheries 121 and will pay particular attention to possible economic tools, including OECD instruments governing international investment and multinational
commercial enterprises, to address the complex business connections that form the backbone of the flag of convenience fishing fleet. 122 The OECD Committee on Fisheries will host a
workshop to discuss these issues in conjunction with its 93 nl
session in April 2004.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The continued prevalence of fishing vessels re-flagging to
avoid compliance with international conservation and management measures, and the growing numbers of fishing vessels
flying flags of convenience, has resuscitated interest in examining the "genuine link" requirement. Both the set of recommendations emerging from the 2003 Report on the United Nations
Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law
of the Sea (hereinafter "UNICPOLOS") and the text of the latest fisheries resolution from the UN General Assembly invite
the "International Maritime Organization [lMO] and other
relevant competent international organizations to study, examine and clarify the role of the "genuine link" in relation to the
duty of flag states to exercise effective control over ships flying
their flag, including fishing vessels.'''23 FAO and IMO have
looked at these issues already; a 2000 joint working group
121 See OECD, 2003, Liberalising Fisheries Markets: Scope and Effects and OECD,
2002, Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy Implications.
122 See, in particular, Ursula Wynhoven, 2003, OECD Instruments and IUU Fishing, OECD Doc. AGRlF1(2003)131PART3 (on file with the author).
123 UN General Assembly draft resolution on Oceans and the law of the sea: sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, 17 Nov. 2003 (UN Doc.
A/58/L.18), para 22. See also United Nations, Report on the work of the United Nations
Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 26 June
2003 (UN Doc. A/58195), para. 18 (b).
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meeting yielded a series of items that eventually were rolled
into the IPOA-IUU, though they did not result in any new insight into the specific meaning of the "genuine link. m ..
In some ways, however, any elaboration of global instruments in this regard is becoming increasingly irrelevant. As
noted above, recent measures adopted within RFMOs to address IUU fishing are virtually identical from one organization
to the next. Almost all bluefin and bigeye tuna fisheries are
covered (or will be covered) by very similar statistical document
programs that are implemented through positive vessel listing
schemes. And most RFMOs with responsibility for straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks have implemented similar
provisions that allow the imposition of trade sanctions on both
the vessels on an agreed IUU list and, eventually, their flag
States. 125 Although, as FAO notes, RFMOs are not supranational entities,126 their scope of application has proven to be
broader than the global treaties. Many states are members or
participants in these bodies who have yet to become party to
the Compliance Agreement or Fish Stocks Agreement - yet
even these non-parties are now effectively bound by the provisions of those treaties as implemented through the RFMOs.
Certification programs such as the tuna statistical documents
and CCAMLR's CDS extend the influence of RFMOs to all participants in the respective fisheries, member or not. 127
124 "Report of the Joint FAOIIMO Ad Hoc Working Group on megal,

Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing and Related Matters", Rome, 9 - 11 October 2000, FAD Fisheries Report No. 937.
125 In all cases, the measures adopted within RFMOs instruct their contracting
parties to adopt trade restrictive measures consist with domestic law and international
obligations. This allows each State to make the determination, before imposing such
sanctions, whether they are consistent with the principles of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (33 ILM 1153) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
To date, no WTO challenges have been raised to sanctions imposed under ICCAT's
trade measures. The WTO Appellate Body in 2001 upheld that, under Article XX (g) of
the GATT trade measures can legitimately be used to support conservation goals, as
long as they are non-discriminatory and applied transparently. See Report of the Appellate Body: United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, AB-2001-4, 22 Oct. 2001,
WTIDS58/ABIRW.
126 FAO, Progress Report to the Thirty-second Session on the Implementation of
the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate megal, Unreported
and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, FAO Doc. C 2003/21, 2.
127 As an example of the potential for RFMO measures to have even broader application, the 12th Conference of the Parties of CITES adopted a recommendation in
2002 that all 164 Parties adopt the CCAMLR CDS "and implement requirements for
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Paradoxically, with the entry into force of the Compliance
Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement, there will likely be an
even greater shift towards seeking solutions to global fisheries
problems through RFMOs. As a first step in an effort to establish an integrated monitoring and control regime, ICCAT
adopted measures at its 2003 Annual Meeting laying out a
binding set of flag State duties. l28 The language tracks closely
with that in Article III of the Compliance Agreement and the
Flag State Duties section of the IPOA-IUU - as a result, even
ICCAT members not party to the Compliance Agreement are
now bound by its key flag state requirements. This is not just a
symbolic requirement; the new comprehensive trade measures
scheme adopted at the same meeting allows ICCAT to enforce
these duties, as any compliance measure, through trade sanctions ifnecessary.'29 Further, with the deposit of instruments of
ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement by the European
Community and all fifteen current member states at the end of
2003, the number of states overall, and major fishing states in
particular, bound by that treaty's mutual boarding and inspection and other compliance provisions is now significant. l30 Still,
it remains that almost none of the most notorious flag of convenience countries have ratified either instrument, though Belize for one has expressed an intention to do SO.131
With its calls for action by individual states, RFMOs, and
the international community as a whole, the IPOA-IUU points
the way forward to gain control over flag of convenience fishing. If states implement the elements of the plan regarding
verification in all cases where specimens of these species are introduced into or exported from or transit through the territory under their jurisdiction." See Resolution
Conf 12.4, "Cooperation between CITES and the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources regarding trade in toothfish."
128 03-12, "Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Duties of Contracting
Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, Entities, or Fishing Entities in Relatheir Vessels Fishing in the ICCAT Convention Area," available at
tion to
http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Recs/Recs2003/2003-12-e.pdf (last visited March 17,
2004).
129 See supra note 82.
130 As of December 31, 2003, fifty States and the European Community have
ratified or acceded to the Fish Stocks Agreement. This number will grow to at least
sixty following the expansion of the EC in 2004 by ten more member States, and their
subsequent accession to the Agreement. See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs
and Law of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronologicaUists_oCratifications.org (last visited March 17, 2004).
131 Supra note 109. Belize is a signatory to the Fish Stocks Agreement.
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control over their vessels and (perhaps more importantly) their
markets and their ports, and RFMOs give effect to the call in
the Fish Stocks Agreement to take necessary measures to ensure cooperation in the conservation and management of
shared fisheries resources, IUU vessels will find it harder to
evade agreed rules no matter where they are flagged. A key
element will be information exchange, both through the F AO
as established in the Compliance Agreement and through coordinated enforcement efforts like the MCS Network. 132 As one
author notes, "we will never be able to assess the effectiveness
of our attempts to eliminate IUU fishing unless we have a
global IUU monitoring program that can tell us whether what
we are doing is having any effect."I33

132 The International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Network for FisheriesRelated Activities (MCS Network) is a network of enforcement professionals who agree
to cooperate and coordinate in the direct exchange of fisheries MCS information and
experiences. It is designed to support countries in satisfying their obligations under
international agreements as well as in carrying out domestic enforcement, available at
http://www.imcsnet.org (last visited March 17, 2004).
133 David J. Agnew & Colin T. Barnes, The Economic and Social Effects of
IUU / Foe Fishing, Background paper for OECD Workshop on Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (lUU)lFlag of Convenience (FOC) Fishing Activities, 19 - 20 Apr. 2004,
OECD Doc. AGRlFIIRD (2003)7,11 (on file with author).
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